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This essay concerns a pattern in treaty actions of the U.S. Senate
which tends to weaken the domestic legal effect of treaties. Under this
pattern, the Senate qualifies its consent to U.S. ratification of the treaty
with a declaration or other condition to the effect that the treaty shall be
non-self-executing, or otherwise expresses its intention that the treaty
shall not be used as a direct source of law in U.S. courts. Such qualifica-
tions, referred to hereinafter as "non-self-executing declarations,"' give
rise to important questions about the place of the affected treaties within
the fabric of U.S. law, especially in light of Article VI of the U.S. Consti-
tution, which provides that treaties of the United States shall be the
"supreme Law of the Land.' ' 2
Non-self-executing declarations must be viewed in the context of
larger questions concerning the respective roles of the legislative, execu-
tive, and judicial branches in the implementation of international law.
As a political phenomenon, the non-self-executing declaration belongs
with the so-called "sovereignty reservation" 3 and related manifestations
of Senatorial reluctance to affect internal U.S. law by means of treaties,
and, more generally, with neo-isolationist preferences for shielding U.S.
institutions from international trends. Proponents of the non-self-execut-
ing declaration argue that it does not impair U.S. treaty compliance but
rather leaves the implementation of treaties to the appropriate domestic
authorities; both elements of this proposition are subject to question. Re-
* Professor of Law, Columbia University. The author gratefully acknowledges the comments
of Louis Henkin on a draft of this essay, and the research assistance of Lydia Tzagoloff of the
Columbia University School of Law.
1. Forms other than those labeled "declarations" might be used to the same effect. The short-
hand term is not ideal: it is of course the treaty, not the declaration, that is intended to be non-self-
executing.
2. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2.
3. The "sovereignty reservation" to the U.S. ratification of the Genocide Convention, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, provided as follows: That nothing in the Convention requires or authorizes
legislation or other action by the United States of America prohibited by the Constitution of the
United States as interpreted by the United States. See 132 CONG. REc. S1377 (daily ed. Feb. 19,
1986). In connection with the Torture Convention, notes 14 and 18 infra, the Senate endorsed
similar language; but the form was to be a notification to all present and prospective ratifying parties
rather than a reservation. See 136 CONG. REc. 17492.
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grettably, the non-self-executing declaration and others of its ilk could
undermine the efficacy of the treaties to which they apply, both within
the United States and in terms of the potential for the United States to
exercise constructive influence abroad. Nor are the declarations war-
ranted in view of the constitutional theories justifying the Senate's role in
the treaty process.
This essay does not challenge the validity of the basic distinction
between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties under U.S. law,
which is long-established (although not beyond question or criticism).
Supreme Court cases going back to the early days of the Republic have
made such distinctions,4 even though Article VI of the Constitution does
not use these categories or suggest that these distinctions can be made.
The concept is essentially a judicial one, created by the courts to govern
their own role with respect to treaties. In brief, U.S. courts have estab-
lished a category of "self-executing" treaties that are treated as directly
effective and immediately applicable in private lawsuits or otherwise, and
have used the term "non-self-executing" to refer to treaties that require
implementing action by the political branches of government or that are
otherwise unsuitable for judicial application. This essay will not attempt
to review the voluminous literature on the self-executing/non-self-exe-
cuting concept in U.S. law, 5 still less in the law of other countries,6 nor
will it repeat the arguments advanced by others that some U.S. judicial
decisions have improperly refused to accord self-executing effect to trea-
ties that warranted direct judicial application.7 Rather, in line with the
theme of the present symposium, this essay will focus on the issues raised
by the actions of the U.S. Senate in purporting to control the domestic
judicial application of treaties.
It is the assumption of this essay that in declarations of this kind,
the Senate has attempted to switch self-executing treaty provisions into
4. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
5. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 111, reporter's note 5 [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]; Yuji Iwasawa, The Doctrine of Self-Executing
Treaties in the United States: A Critical Analysis, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 627 (1986); John H. Jackson,
Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems A Policy Analysis, 86 AM. J. INT'L. L 310 (1992);
Jordan Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 760 (1988).
6. See Luzius WILDHABER, TREATY-MAKING POWER AND CONSTITUTION 226-34 (1971).
Since Wildhaber examined only pluralistic democracies, he had no occasion to consider the treaty
practices of the former Soviet Union, which have lately been of interest to the present writer. Rele-
vant Soviet literature includes REIN MULLERSON, SOOTNOSHENIE MEZHDUNARODNOGO I NAT-
SIONAL'NOGO PRAVA [THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL LAW] 55-
82 (1982).
Another recent study discusses cross-national comparisons is Jackson, supra note 5, at 310.
7. See, e.g., Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties and U.S. v. Postal:
Win at Any Price?, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 892 (1980); Paust, supra note 5.
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the non-self-executing category. That is, if the courts on their own would
treat certain provisions as self-executing in the absence of any contrary
indication from the "treaty-makers," 8 the presence of such a declaration
purports to reverse that outcome. Although it is hypothetically possible
that the Senate might choose to append such declarations only to treaties
that the courts would find non-self-executing on their own, that hypothe-
sis does not fit the actual pattern in which such declarations have been
used. In the cases discussed below, the Senate has acted out of an ex-
plicit or implicit motivation to preclude the courts from using the treaty
as a source of law, even though the treaty by its nature or its terms would
otherwise lend itself to direct judicial application.9
In the peculiar scheme established by Article II of the U.S. Consti-
tution for making treaties, only the Senate participates in this particular
form of international agreement, yet there is a widely shared view that
the House of Representatives may be constitutionally required to partici-
pate with respect to at least some subjects that might be governed by
treaty. Although scholars debate the proper delineation of spheres in
which the President and Senate as treaty-makers must or should be
joined by the Congress in the law-making mode, several areas are usually
believed to require the House's participation, including:
* raising of revenue;
" appropriation of funds;
" enactment of criminal penalties; and
* declaration of war. 10
Treaties making commitments in these fields are sometimes accompanied
by an action on the part of the Senate (by reservation, declaration, or
otherwise) recognizing the constitutional prerogatives of the other house
of Congress; or, even in cases when the participation of the House is not
necessarily required by the Constitution, the Senate might choose for
political reasons to ensure that the House participates in the domestic
implementation of the treaty. I To the extent that the Senate acts in def-
8. This term refers to the President and Senate acting together in the treaty mode. Strictly
speaking, the declarations in question are actions of the "treaty-makers" rather than the Senate
alone. The political impetus for a declaration in a particular case may originate with either the
President or the Senate or be shared.
9. See infra, text at notes 18-41. The declarations are absent from treaties whose non-self-
executing character is non-controversial in U.S. practice; they are not found, for example, in alliance
or arms control treaties.
10. RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 111, cmt. i and reporter's note 6. Paust, however, questions
the RESTATEMENT on this point.
11. Cf Power Authority of New York v. Federal Power Commission, 247 F.2d 538 (D.C. Cir.),
vacated, 355 U.S. 64 (1957) (Senate reservation provided that exercise of U.S. rights under treaty
would await specific authorization by Congress).
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erence to the more majoritarian House of Representatives, its action may
be justifiable, but the actual pattern goes well beyond this concern. The
Senate has used the non-self-executing declaration even as to issues
where the House is not expected to take action, in order to preserve a
particular model of federal-state relations and to avoid creating new
sources of federal judicial jurisdiction.
In the opinion of this writer the trend toward non-self-executing
treaty declarations is unfortunate and should be resisted. Domestic judi-
cial application of international treaties should be encouraged in the in-
terests of effective enforcement of international law as well as the
development of a body of jurisprudence under the treaties. The U.S. Sen-
ate's motivations for precluding direct judicial application of the treaties
doubtless include a justifiable pride in indigenous sources of U.S. law.
But judicial application of treaties can enrich rather than pollute those
sources, and there is no good reason for the Senate to prevent U.S. courts
from contributing to the evolution of international practice.
Part I of this essay examines the usage of non-self-executing declara-
tions in recent U.S. practice, with examples drawn from human rights
treaties and economic agreements. Part II considers and criticizes the
several rationales that might be proffered in justification of the use of
non-self-executing declarations, and contends that the device should be
confined to the limited class of cases when the House of Representatives
is expected to become actively engaged in implementing the treaty.
12
I. THE NON-SELF-EXECUTING DECLARATION IN U.S. PRACTICE
The non-self-executing declaration is not new in U.S. practice, 13 but
this essay will concentrate on some of its most recent manifestations, es-
pecially as regards the Torture Convention. 14 Non-self-executing decla-
rations and similar limiting techniques have also been used or
recommended with respect to a variety of other human rights treaties
that have been proposed for U.S. ratification. But the pattern is not con-
fined to the human rights sphere: non-self-executing declarations have
also been used in treaties of an economic character, including the Berne
12. For a different set of arguments criticizing non-self-executing declarations, see Charles H.
Dearborn III, Note, The Domestic Legal Effect of Declarations That Treaty Provisions are Not Self-
Executing, 57 TEX. L. REV. 233 (1979).
13. Riesenfeld, supra note 7, refers to historical examples.
14. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Pun-
ishment, opened for signature Feb. 4, 1985, G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/708 (1984), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984) [hereinafter Torture
Convention].
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Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. 15
A. Human Rights Treaties
The issue of the self-executing or non-self-executing nature of
human rights treaties has arisen whenever the U.S. administration has
proposed or the Senate has taken up the question of potential U.S. adher-
ence to such treaties. As is well known, treaty opponents led by Senator
Bricker sought to amend the U.S. Constitution in the 1950s to thwart
U.S. adherence to human rights treaties; and even after that effort failed,
political opposition in the Senate made it impossible to bring such trea-
ties forward for many years. Not until the advent of the Carter adminis-
tration in 1977 was there any significant movement, and even then it was
tentative and highly conditioned.
When the Carter administration asked the Senate to approve four
human rights treaties in 1977 and a fifth in 1980, the executive branch's
submissions would have had the Senate declare each of the treaties to be
non-self-executing. 16 This move was intended to make the treaties more
palatable to those who shared Senator Bricker's aversion to encroach-
ment on areas traditionally falling within state rather than federal juris-
diction. There were differing opinions on what aspects of the treaties
would have been self-executing in the absence of the declarations.17 In
any event, the Senate did not act on the treaties during the Carter admin-
istration's tenure, and the Reagan administration let them languish.
1. The Torture Convention
The Senate took up the Torture Convention at the request of Presi-
dents Reagan and Bush and adopted a resolution of advice and consent
to ratification on October 27, 1990 which included the following declara-
tion: "(1) That the United States declares that the provisions of Articles
15. Sept. 1986, as revised at Paris, July 24, 1971, - U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. -, 3 WIPO &
UNESCO, COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD, Berne Cony. (Item H) (Supp. 1974).
16. The four treaties put forward in 1977-78 were the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, the International Covenant on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, the International Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, March 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, and the American
Convention on Human Rights, July 19, 1978, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 101 (1970). The 1980 submission
concerned the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. For
discussion and criticism of the proposed non-self-executing declarations, see MALVINA HALBER-
STAM & ELIZABETH DEFEIS, WOMEN'S LEGAL RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS - AN AL-
TERNATIVE TO ERA? 50-63 (1987); David Weissbrodt, United States Ratification of the Human
Rights Covenants, 63 MINN. L. REV. 35, 66-72 (1978).
17. See generally International Human Rights Treaties: Hearings before the Sen. For. Rels.
Comm., 96th Cong., 1st Sess., at (e.g.) 29-30, 40-41, 276-316, 346-49 (Nov. 14-19, 1979); see also
PROC. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 218 (1978).
1991]
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1 through 16 of the Convention are not self-executing." '
An executive branch lawyer who was involved in the effort to obtain
the Senate's advice and consent to the Torture Convention has explained
that the declaration means that Articles 1 through 16 "do not establish
rights enforceable in United States courts unless and until Congress has
approved implementing legislation." 19 He added:
Given the language of the Convention, for example requiring each
State Party to criminalize acts of torture and to take "effective legisla-
tive, administrative, judicial and other measures" to prevent such acts,
there is little room to argue that the Convention was intended to be
self-executing. 20
With due respect to the author of the quoted passage, the argument
that the Convention would have been non-self-executing even without
the declaration is fallacious. Admittedly, provisions of the Convention
requiring the enactment of criminal penalties would be non-self-execut-
ing both by their own terms and under U.S. law, 21 but that does not
dispose of the remaining provisions. Just as the Senate's declaration dif-
ferentiated between Articles 1-16 and the remainder of the Convention,
22
distinctions could easily have been made between provisions of the Con-
vention that would be non-self-executing and provisions that would be
self-executing.
An example of the latter is Article 15, which provides that state-
ments made as a result of torture shall not be invoked as evidence in any
proceedings. Substantively, this provision meets all the ordinary tests to
qualify it as self-executing: it aims at securing rights invocable at the
instance of private persons, it addresses itself to judicial action, and it is
concrete enough to be applied by courts without further legislative direc-
tion. A U.S. court, confronted with a motion to suppress evidence on the
grounds that the evidence was procured by torture, could readily treat
Article 15 as self-executing and exclude evidence in reliance on it.
18. See 136 Cong. Rec. S17492 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990). As of the time this essay was prepared
(fall 1991), the United States had not yet deposited its instrument of ratification of the Torture
Convention because implementing legislation had not yet been enacted.
19. David P. Stewart, The Torture Convention and the Reception of International Criminal Law
within the United States, 15 NOVA L. REV. 449, 467-68 (1991).
20. Id. at 468 n.67.
21. For example, Article 4, requiring state parties to "ensure that all acts of torture are offenses
under its criminal law" and to "make these offenses punishable by appropriate penalties which take
into account their grave nature," appears to be non-self-executing by its own terms and also falls
within the category that U.S. courts and commentators have generally considered non-self-execut-
ing. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 111, cmt. i and reporter's note 6.
22. Articles 17-end generally concern the international rather than domestic implementation of
the treaty (establishment and competence of the Committee against Torture; final clauses). Thus the
question of their self-executing nature does not arise.
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The question whether the Constitution and laws of the United States
and the several states would require or authorize the same result on in-
dependent grounds is analytically distinct from the self-executing treaty
issue, and the Administration and Senate may have improperly blurred
that distinction. Although this is not the place for a full analysis of po-
tential gaps between what is already established in U.S. law and what the
Torture Convention provides, the same example of exclusion of evidence
procured by torture can illustrate the point. While U.S. law does require
suppression of evidence procured by torture in most circumstances that
might arise in a U.S. court, recent cases cast doubt on whether U.S. legal
protections satisfy the Torture Convention's requirements where certain
transnational elements are involved. Specifically, (1) a non-U.S. citizen
may not be able to invoke U.S. constitutional protections with respect to
torture committed outside the United States, even if the perpetrators
were U.S. officials; and (2) even U.S. citizens might not be protected by
the constitutional rule of exclusion of evidence if the torturers were for-
eign officials.
As to the first situation, in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,23 the
U.S. Supreme Court refused to apply the Fourth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution to the seizure of evidence from the home of a non-U.S. citi-
zen outside U.S. territory, and the Court's broadly written opinion casts
doubt on whether an alien could rely on the Constitution as to any activ-
ity occurring outside the United States.24 As to the second situation,
U.S. criminal cases in which the defendant has sought to suppress evi-
dence procured by torture occurring outside the United States have re-
quired the defendant (whether citizen or alien) to show that the torturers
were U.S. rather than foreign officials, as a prerequisite for applying the
Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule.25 As a presumptively self-exe-
cuting provision, Article 15 of the Torture Convention could have sup-
plied the protections that may be lacking under the U.S. Constitution,
but now victims of torture in such cases would be left with only such
legislative protections as Congress or the several states see fit to grant.
The Administration's argument concerning the alleged relationship
between the non-self-executing declaration and potential implementing
23. 494 U.S. 259 (1990). For comprehensive discussion of the issues involved in constitutional
claims by aliens, see Gerald Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L. J. 909 (1991).
24. Earlier cases from the lower courts, including United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d
Cir.), rehearing denied, 504 F.2d 1380 (2d Cir. 1974), had followed a different line of reasoning to
extend constitutional concepts to conduct by U.S. officials abroad that "shocked the conscience." In
light of Verdugo-Urquidez, the prospects for maintaining such claims are much weaker and possibly
extinguished.
25. RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 433(3) and reporter's notes 1,3.
1991]
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legislation is likewise misconceived, and indeed the Administration's po-
sition seems inconsistent. On the one hand the Administration claimed,
and the Senate agreed, that U.S. law taken as a whole (that is, consider-
ing federal and state laws in their totality) already complied with the
Torture Convention, and only minimal gaps were identified to be filled by
implementing legislation.2 6 If the Administration is correct about the
substantial conformity of U.S. law to the Convention's requirements,
then there is no reason to erect an artificial barrier to the application of
the Convention as a complementary but fully compatible source of law.
On the other hand, to the extent that the Convention may provide
greater protection than either the Constitution or statutory law (as in the
extraterritorial torture example suggested above), then it is all the more
important to allow the Convention to operate of its own force.
2. The Genocide Convention
In connection with the Genocide Convention, the classic form of
non-self-executing declaration was not used, but the functional
equivalent emerged. Neither the Reagan Administration nor its prede-
cessors27 proposed an explicit non-self-executing declaration and none
was formally added by the Senate, but the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee expressed the view in its report on the treaty that the Con-
vention would be non-self-executing. 28 The resolution of advice and con-
sent adopted February 19, 1986 contained the "sovereignty reservation"
referred to above, 29 and also declared as follows: That the President will
not deposit the instrument of ratification until after the implementing
legislation referred to in Article V has been enacted.30 After a substantial
delay (about three years), both houses of Congress finally acted on the
implementing legislation which defined genocide as a federal crime and
established the applicable criminal penalties. 31 The legislation contained
the following provision relevant to the effect of the Genocide Convention
in U.S. domestic law: "Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as...
26. "Since United States law, at both the federal and state levels, seems to be fully in compli-
ance with the Convention, it may only be necessary to establish federal jurisdiction over offenses
committed by United States nationals outside the United States, and over foreign offenders commit-
ting torture abroad who are later found in a territory under United States jurisdiction, under Art.
VI(1) and (2) respectively." Stewart, supra note 19, at 468 n.67.
27. Every American president from Truman through Reagan supported the Convention, with
varying degrees of enthusiasm. Senatorial advice and consent to ratification was given during the
tenure of President Reagan.
28. See S. EXEC. REP. No. 2, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1985), reprinted in 80 AM. J. INT'L L.
612, 621 (1986).
29. U.S. CONST. art. IV, cl. 2.
30. 132 CONG. REc. S1377-78 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1986).
31. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1091-1093 (1988).
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creating any substantive or procedural right enforceable by law by any
party in any civil proceeding. ' 32 The cumulative import of the Genocide
Convention's history is that the Senate for its part (in acting on the basis
of the committee report referred to above), and the Congress as a whole
in adopting the implementing legislation, have expressed an intention to
confine the domestic legal effect of the Genocide Convention to such
criminal proceedings as may be brought pursuant to the implementing
legislation, and have purported to preclude reliance on the Genocide
Convention as a source of civilly enforceable rights.
3. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
As this essay was in preparation, the Bush Administration asked the
Senate to take up the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, with a package of reservations, declarations, and other provisos
drawn in part from the conditions which the Carter Administration sug-
gested 33 and shaped by the recent experience with Senatorial approval of
the Torture Convention. Accordingly, a non-self-executing declaration
was requested by the Administration and embodied in the resolution of
advice and consent to ratification adopted by the Senate on April 2,
1992. 34 No implementing legislation was planned, on the theory that
U.S. law is already in sufficient compliance with the Covenant. 35 The
apparent effect of the non-self-executing declaration is to remove the
Covenant as a potential source of judicially enforceable rights, even when
such rights would be fully compatible with the protection already ac-
corded by constitutional, statutory, and common law.
B. Economic Treaties
Lest it be thought that human rights treaties are the sole field in
which the treaty-makers have acted to deny the direct applicability of
treaties as a source of law, I will make brief mention of comparable activ-
ity in the economic field.
1. Berne Convention
In 1989 the United States finally acceded to the 1886 Berne Conven-
32. 18 U.S.C. § 1093 (1988).
33. See supra note 15.
34. 138 CONG. REc. 4781 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992).
35. In places where U.S. law would not be in compliance-for example, as regards Article 20 of
the Covenant, which requires criminalization of certain forms of expression protected under the
First Amendment to the Constitution-specific reservations have been adopted as qualifications on
U.S. consent to be bound.
1991]
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tion for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,36 the oldest and
most important multilateral copyright treaty. With respect to the ques-
tion of whether the Berne Convention should be treated as self-executing,
the report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee stated in relevant
part as follows:
If an international agreement is silent as to its self-executing character,
then one must look to statements of the Executive and Congress to
make this determination. In the case of the Berne Convention, the
President, in his letter of transmittal, stated that "... . the Convention
will require legislation. Until this legislation is enacted, the United
States instrument of accession will not be deposited .... " In addition
to the President's statement, both Senate and House Judiciary Com-
mittees have emphatically stated that this convention is not self-
executing.
37
Accordingly, the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 198838 went
to great lengths to establish that the treaty itself could not be invoked as
a source of rights in U.S. courts, but rather only the implementing legis-
lation or such other sources of law as the implementing legislation en-
dorsed could be so invoked. 39
It appears that both the Senate acting in its treaty capacity, and the
Congress acting to adopt the implementing legislation, were concerned to
ensure that U.S. adherence to the Berne Convention should neither ex-
pand nor diminish protections of moral rights of authors. Congress be-
lieved that existing U.S. law was adequate to satisfy Berne standards on
this point and did not wish to work any substantive change in the sources
of law that would be applicable in the absence of Berne with respect to
moral rights. The report of the Senate Judiciary Committee was
emphatic:
Neither Berne adherence, nor the satisfaction of U.S. obligations under
Berne, should be used by the courts as justification either for ex-
panding or reducing the recognition of these rights under U.S. law.
The courts remain free, of course, to expand or reduce the recognition
of these rights based on other principles of statutory construction or
common law decision-making, wholly apart from U.S. adherence to
Berne.4
36. Supra note 15.
37. S. EXEC. REP. No. 17, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1988), reprinted in 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 64,
67 (1989).
38. Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101 note (1988)). For discus-
sion see John M. Kernochan & Jane C. Ginsburg, One Hundred and Two Years Later: The United
States Joins the Berne Convention, 13 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1 (1988).
39. Berne Act, §§ 2, 3, 4, 6, discussed in Kernochan & Ginsburg supra note 38 at 5, 6, 27-32.
40. S. REP. No. 352, 100th Cong., 2d Ses. 39 (1988). The Berne Act, §§ 3 & 4, specifically
provides that Berne adherence shall not expand or reduce certain rights claimed under federal, state,
or common law.
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To an international lawyer concerned with the operation of treaties gen-
erally, it is naturally troubling that the Senate and Congress would single
out a treaty obligation of the United States as the only source of law that
U.S. courts are not supposed to consider, but that is what happened. The
only consolation, apparently, is that the outcome might have been sub-
stantively worse, in that opponents of the Berne approach to moral rights
did not achieve their objective of preventing any recognition of such
rights in the United States.
41
2. Trade Agreements
The contribution by Professors Riesenfeld and Abbott to the present
symposium draws attention to a pattern of statutes in which the U.S.
Congress has determined that a series of trade agreements to which the
United States is party should not be construed as creating private rights
or remedies in U.S. courts.4 2 Provisions to this effect are found in the
legislation approving and implementing the Tokyo Round Codes, the
Israel-United States Free Trade Area Agreement, and the Canada-
United States Free Trade Agreement.43 The import of these provisions is
similar to that of non-self-executing declarations, in that U.S. courts are
precluded from applying the international agreements as a direct source
of law.
Professors Riesenfeld and Abbott distinguish these acts of Congress
concerning the domestic legal effect of international agreements from
unicameral actions of the U.S. Senate and suggest that only Congress as a
whole, and not the Senate acting alone, has the constitutional power to
take the actions in question. Under their view, because the Senate lacks
the plenary legislative powers which belong to the Congress under the
Constitution, its power to attach conditions to treaties should be confined
to conditions which are acceptable under international law and practice.
Their principal thesis is that the Senate may not attach conditions which
would violate international law: the power to legislate in violation of
international law is in their view a congressional, not senatorial power.
Additionally, they claim that the Senate has no power to control the do-
mestic legal effect of a treaty: only Congress and the courts may consti-
tutionally determine whether a treaty will or will not have self-executing
effect. In my view the relevant point is not that Congress has constitu-
41. Kernochan & Ginsburg, supra note 38, at 27.
42. Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Fredrick M. Abbott, The Scope of US. Senate Control Over the





tional power to violate international law (a power that the Supreme
Court has of course confirmed repeatedly), but rather that Congress has
constitutional authority to determine how to implement international
agreements in foreign trade as in other fields.44 In the exercise of that
authority Congress may determine to set up domestic regulatory agencies
and specialized bodies for the implementation of trade law, in lieu of
having these issues go to courts of general jurisdiction. Moreover, Con-
gress may reserve to itself the authority to decide on a case-by-case basis
whether, how, and in what time frame to give effect to the results of
negotiations or third-party settlement of trade (or other) disputes. The
more that Congress has become actively engaged in implementing trade
agreements, the more it makes sense to think of a legislative-regulatory
model instead of a judicial model for handling trade issues. On that basis
the no-private-right-of-action statutes are entirely understandable.
In contrast, non-self-executing declarations of the U.S. Senate typi-
cally seem to abdicate the function of deciding how a treaty is to be im-
plemented, rather than exercising that function. The Senate's only
opportunity to affect implementation of a treaty is at the time it acts on
the resolution of advice and consent; it has no ongoing role thereafter,
whereas the Congress has continuing responsibilities with respect to all
spheres of law-making, including those involving international obliga-
tions. Thus, unless the Senate makes a conscious decision to prefer a
mode of implementation that will be equal or superior to judicial enforce-
ment of treaties, or to defer to Congress in the expectation that Congress
will make such a decision, the non-self-executing declaration is an abdi-
cation of responsibility.
II. THE SENATE'S PROPER ROLE IN DETERMINING THE DOMESTIC
LEGAL EFFECT OF U.S. TREATIES
As previously noted,45 the decision whether a treaty is self-executing
is ordinarily made by the courts on the basis of criteria elaborated in
court decisions. Judicial and scholarly authorities both indicate that "the
intent of the parties" is relevant to the determination of a treaty's self-
executing effect, and the Senate's position upon giving consent to a treaty
will ordinarily be honored by the courts.46 As a prediction of what
judges will do in fact, it is likely that U.S. courts would consider the
Senate's expression of preference as carrying great weight and would
44. E.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 ("Law of Nations"), but also the foreign commerce
power and the foreign affairs power, as well as the necessary and proper clause.
45. See supra text accompanying notes 4-7.
46. See REsTATEMENT, supra note 5, §§ 111(3), 111(4)(b) and cmt. h.
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therefore be reluctant to apply as a direct source of law any treaty cov-
ered by a non-self-executing declaration. Such declarations seem suffi-
ciently related to the Senate's acknowledged powers in connection with
the treaty process that courts would probably be inclined to give them
effect in accordance with their terms.
47
Yet this predictive judgment does not conclude the inquiry. The
issue of the Senate's constitutional power to control the domestic legal
effect of a treaty has never been presented to the Supreme Court for deci-
sion, and such lower court authority as exists on related questions is
neither directly on point nor considered good law by contemporary ex-
perts.48 There is room for the argument that the Senate's power to attach
conditions must be appraised in light of the constitutional justifications
for the Senate's role in the treaty process. Non-self-executing declara-
tions do indeed raise constitutional questions in this broader sense.
It is incumbent on each branch of government to exercise its consti-
tutional powers in a manner faithful to the structures, relationships, and
values underlying our constitutional scheme. The Senate's prerogative to
qualify its consent as an incident of a shared treaty power is not an unfet-
tered discretion to attach any kind of condition. A Senate declaration
purporting to negate the legal effect of otherwise self-executing treaty
provisions is constitutionally questionable as a derogation from the ordi-
nary application of Article VI of the Constitution; accordingly, it should
not be sustained unless there is some constitutionally-based justification
for the Senate to inject itself into the question.
Let us consider some of the theories under which Senatorial condi-
tions to ratification might be defended:
A. As a check on Presidential power.
The Senate's power to withhold consent to treaties is part of the
Framers' carefully designed system of checks and balances; the Senate
acts as the surrogate for the American people in determining the accepta-
bility of Presidential proposals to incur international obligations. Senato-
47. Professor Henkin has pointed out the absence of a generally accepted theory for the Sen-
ate's attachment of such conditions to treaties, but has noted that they may be considered part of the
treaty's "penumbra" or ancillary to the Senate's advice and consent role. Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND THE CoNsTrrTION 160-61 (1972).
48. In the highly exceptional Power Authority case cited in note 11 supra, an intermediate court
of appeals refused to give effect to a Senatorial reservation purporting to affect the domestic imple-
mentation of a bilateral treaty. The authority of the case is in doubt (see generally HENKIN, id. at
134-35, 380-81 n.28), and in any event its reasoning-which concerned limitations on treaty reserva-




rial conditions aimed at curtailing the risks to the nation of a proposed
international agreement or curbing Presidential self-aggrandizement are
consistent with this constitutional design. Non-self-executing declara-
tions have nothing to do with this function, however. Indeed, in the in-
stances previously surveyed the Executive Branch not only supported or
even initiated the proposed declarations but might well benefit from
them, to the extent that the non-self-executing declaration would remove
the courts as a potential check on executive actions contrary to the
treaty. As an example, an executive officer could invoke the non-self-
executing declaration to avoid scrutiny of actions alleged to violate the
Torture Convention.
B. As protective of the prerogatives of the House of Representatives.
We should consider three variants of the theory of non-self-execut-
ing declarations as protective of the prerogatives of the House of
Representatives:
1. Whether the House is constitutionally required to participate.
If the House has a constitutionally mandated role with respect to
the subject matter of the treaty (an issue which is itself a controversial
one), then a non-self-executing declaration would be most appropriate.
In accordance with the widespread view that at least a few subjects do
require the participation of the House, I would not quarrel with Senato-
rial actions intended to affirm that the Senate by itself (or the Senate-and-
President together) cannot exercise the power of the purse or the war
power, or any other power which by customary practice in the United
States is generally handled on the basis of bicameral action.49 But the
sphere of application of the non-self-executing declarations surveyed
above goes well beyond this. In particular, there is no constitutional re-
quirement that the House act in parallel to the Senate with respect to
treaties that would strengthen judicial protection of human rights.50
2. When involvement of the House is politically essential.
The political necessity to engage the House in the implementation of
the treaty may be a valid reason for a non-self-executing declaration. But
49. See supra text accompanying notes 10-11.
50. As to treaties affecting commerce, the House has a stronger claim to involvement, but in the
opinion of the present writer the claim is political rather than constitutionally-mandated. Within the
confines of the present essay it is not possible to go into the full constitutional theory underlying this
proposition. Suffice it to say that in the treaty practice of the United States, Article II treaties
involving the Senate but not the House have often been used.
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one may question whether this is always a bona fide motivation. The
argument of deference to the House may be nothing more than a guise in
which a tiny minority of disgruntled Senators can attempt an end-run
around the already stringent supra-majoritarian scheme for treaty ap-
proval. As Professor Henkin has said:
Declaring a treaty to be non-self-executing and requiring implementing
legislation delays and creates obstacles to our carrying out our interna-
tional obligations, encourages members of Congress to delay or frus-
trate legislation to give effect to the treaty, especially Senators who did
not favor the treaty and, even more, members of the House of Repre-
sentatives who had not previously considered it.51
If the treaty is of the sort that could be applied by courts without further
legislative direction, then why go through the superfluous action of ad-
ding House approval to the Senate's two-thirds approval, which pursuant
to Articles II and VI of the Constitution is constitutionally sufficient for
this purpose?
In cases where there is a political imperative to engage the House in
implemention, the House's interest is more than adequately protected by
a direction to the President not to incur the international obligation until
the implementing legislation has been adopted.5 2 Upon the enactment of
the legislation, however, the rationale of safeguarding the House's inter-
ests disappears; and unless the House, Senate and President together de-
termine to use the implementing legislation to preclude the courts from
giving direct effect to the treaty, the courts should proceed as they ordi-
narily would under Articles III and VI.
C. When a preexisting statute deals with the subject matter in a
manner inconsistent with the treaty.
The self-executing/non-self-executing distinction can affect the rela-
tionship between two different sources of U.S. law that deal inconsis-
tently with the same subject matter. Specifically, the U.S. Supreme
Court has followed a "later-in-time" rule that places statutes and treaties
on the same footing and allows the U.S. Congress to supersede the do-
mestic legal effect of a treaty by means of subsequently-enacted legisla-
tion;53 the operation of this rule with respect to a subsequent treaty has
51. Louis HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 63 (1990);
Louis Henkin, Treaties in a Constitutional Democracy, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 406, 425 (1989).
52. The protection is "more than adequate" because under international law a party to a treaty
may be accorded a reasonable amount of time to conform its domestic legislation before it would be
considered in default. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § Ill cmt. h.
53. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888).
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been conditioned, however, on the self-executing nature of the treaty. 54
Thus the apparent effect of a non-self-executing declaration attached to
an otherwise self-executing treaty would be to allow prior inconsistent
statutory law to prevail, even though the courts would have allowed the
treaty to supersede the statute in the absence of the declaration.
It is submitted that there is no justification for using a non-self-exe-
cuting declaration to preserve an inconsistent statute that predates the
treaty. The practice would create an entirely indefensible gap between
domestic law and international obligation. Whatever concerns the Sen-
ate may have about the relationship of the treaty to statutory policy
should be resolved before advice and consent is given and ratification
takes place. If the administration, or a faction within the Senate, has a
political or philosophical objection to tampering with statutes by means
of treaties, then the issue should be confronted directly-as, for example,
by submitting the international agreement as a congressional-executive
agreement rather than a treaty through the back door of a non-self-exe-
cuting declaration.
C. As protective of states' rights.
Under this view, Senators serve as proxies for the interests of states;
they may promote their perceptions of those interests by acting on a phil-
osophical preference for a state-centered model of the preferable distribu-
tion of substantive authorities. But this view ignores the definitive
repudiation of theories of limitations on the treaty power emanating from
inchoate claims of states' rights. By virtue of both the authoritative deci-
sion of the Supreme Court in Missouri v. Holland 55 and the rejection of
Senator Bricker's attempts to reverse that decision by means of constitu-
tional amendment, our constitutional law is clear: the treaty-makers
may make supreme law binding on the states as to any subject, and no-
tions of states' rights should not be asserted as impediments to the full
implementation of treaty obligations. If a decision is made at the federal
level, concurred in by two-thirds of the Senate, that the national interest
would be served by entering into a treaty, then state-centered interests do
not justify blunting federal judicial enforcement of an otherwise self-exe-
cuting treaty.
The proponents of the non-self-executing declarations may have as-
sumed that the declarations would prevent the treaties from displacing
existing state laws or policies, but this view misunderstands the applica-
54. Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933).
55. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
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tion of Article VI's Supremacy Clause. As stated by the Restatement of
Foreign Relations Law of the United States: "Even a non-self-executing
agreement of the United States, not effective as law until implemented by
legislative or executive action, may sometimes be held to be federal policy
superseding State law or policy."'56 The Framers insisted on a system of
federal treaty supremacy so that it would not be necessary to ask the
states to take action to give effect to international obligations. There is
no warrant for the Senate to seek to turn this system inside-out with
respect to particular treaties.
D. As a limitation on judicial power.
Article III of the Constitution establishes federal judicial jurisdic-
tion over treaty-based cases, yet the non-self-executing declaration pur-
ports to tell courts not to apply a treaty in cases that could otherwise
properly come before them. This deviation from the normal mode of
treaty implementation cannot be justified in view of the respective roles
of the Senate and the judiciary concerning treaties. The Framers explic-
itly contemplated judicial enforcement of treaties; they did not envision
any role for the Senate in treaty implementation, beyond giving advice
and consent to ratification,- 7 and they certainly did not expect the Senate
to stand in the way of the courts' discharge of a constitutionally-estab-
lished function.
The non-self-executing declaration seems to be a vote of no-confi-
dence in the courts which would otherwise have authority to apply the
treaty, yet there is no reason to think that courts would discharge this
function less responsibly than any other branch. The main factor setting
treaties apart from other sources of law that courts typically apply is the
participation of non-U.S. actors-for example, foreign tribunals, diplo-
mats, or international organizations-in the interpretation and applica-
tion of treaties. The Senate most likely acted on an unarticulated
preference for insulating the United States from these foreign influences,
at least as to subject matters already regulated by a parallel body of U.S.
law that is evolving in linear fashion. The concern is at least exaggerated
and in my view entirely unwarranted.
To date, the issue of subordinating U.S. courts to some foreign tri-
bunal is largely hypothetical with respect to the treaties covered by non-
self-executing declarations.58 Rather, the prevailing mode of treaty im-
56. RESTATEMENT § 115, cmt. e.
57. Cf Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S. 176 (1901) (Senate cannot affect
interpretation of treaty after ratification).
58. In the future this issue could arise if, for example, the United States were to accept the
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plementation is decentralized action by national decisionmakers, includ-
ing courts. Under such a decentralized system, no national court is
compelled to accept the judgment of any foreign interpreter of the same
treaty, but each may (or may not) influence the other to the extent of the
persuasive force of its decisions. Thus, U.S. courts applying international
treaties as a source of law need not adopt any ill-founded interpretation
of the treaty by a foreign actor. Yet if U.S. courts do not apply interna-
tional treaties, then they lose the opportunity to contribute constructively
to the evolution of international practice.
III. CONCLUSION
It would be far preferable for the Senate to discontinue the device of
non-self-executing treaty declarations, both prospectively and retroac-
tively, outside the limited class of treaties entailing a compelling reason
to engage the House of Representatives in implementation. Meanwhile,
there may be ways to mitigate the damaging effects of non-self-executing
declarations. For example, U.S. courts generally follow a rule of at-
tempting to construe domestic sources of law harmoniously with interna-
tional obligations, unless they receive unambiguous contrary instructions
from the political branches. Even though a non-self-executing declara-
tion purports to tell courts not to give direct effect to the treaty, it does
not go so far as to instruct them to violate it; nor does it forbid a judge to
take account of how foreign counterparts have applied a treaty to which
the United States is a party. Nothing in a non-self-executing declaration
necessarily has to prevent internationally-minded jurists from applying
other sources of law-constitutional, statutory, regulatory, or custom-
ary-in a manner that will promote the objectives of international trea-
ties. But the effectiveness of international law would be strengthened by
eliminating this unnecessary impediment to judicial enforcement of
treaties.
authority of international committees to consider individual petitions under human rights treaties.
The United States has deliberately refrained from doing so with respect to the Torture Convention
add the International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights and has not yet considered the ques-
tion with respect to other human rights treaties. The optional state-to-state form of jurisdiction
which the United States has agreed to accept has been virtually ignored in international practice so
far.
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